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THE POST-COLONIAL AFRICAN STATE
COLLAPSED STATES: THE DISINTEGRATION AND
RESTORATION OF LEGITIMATE AuTlbomRY.
Edited by I. William Zartman
Reviewed by Dr. Makau wa Mutua
I. INTRODUCTION
The end of the Cold War has dramatically altered assump-
tions about the viability of the international state system and
plunged the world into crises of sovereignty and statehood.'
* Associate Director, Human Rights Program, Harvard Law School. LL.B.
1983, LL.M. 1984, University of Dar-es-salaam; LL.M. 1985, S.J.D. 1987, Harvard
Law School. Visiting Professor, University of Puerto Rico School of Law, Summer
1995. Chairman, Kenya Human Rights Commission. The author is grateful to
Henry Steiner for years of scholarly exchange and inspiration. He is especially
grateful to his wife, Athena Mutua, for her unstinting support and intellectual
contribution, without which this article would not have been possible.
1. Perhaps more than at any other time in recent decades, the world today
is in the midst of acute social, political, and economic upheavals. These disloca-
tions have been partially spurred by the end of the Cold War, a development that
has seen the collapse of the post-1945 world order, premised in part, as it was, on
the division between the West and the East. One example of these crises has been
the speed with which some nation-states have ceased to exist and many others
have been born out of the disfiguration of existing ones. For example, the former
Soviet Union broke up into at least fifteen separate, independent, and sovereign
states. East Germany and the Federal Republic of Germany have become one and
Yugoslavia has split into Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and
Serbia and Montenegro. On the African continent, Eritrea proclaimed its sovereign
independence from Ethiopia in April 1993, after a long and bitter secessionist war.
See The Birth of New Nations, BOSTON GLOBE, July 5, 1995, at 14 (discussing the
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Nowhere is this crisis more keenly felt than in Africa.2 It is as
though the African state has gone from the frying pan and into
the fire.3 Four decades after decolonization from European
imperial rule, mounting evidence suggests the African post-
colonial state may soon disappear. Despite halting attempts at
democratization, its implosion appears to be progressing
steadily. In virtually every statistical category, the state is in a
downward spiral. Corrupt and dictatorial elites, unbridled
militaries, ethnic tensions, and economic misery have arrest-
ed-and in many cases reversed-almost all positive develop-
ment. Some Western writers have characterized the situation
in Africa as anarchic.4
proliferation of new states in the post-Cold War period). Elsewhere, the state is
under attack by advocates of democratic reform, as in most of Africa, or religious
groups, as in north Africa and the Middle East, or a combination of religious
groups, social movements, and ethnic forces. In a number of European states,
particularly in Germany and France, Neo-Nazism, racist conservatism and paranoia
are on the rise. In the United States itself, the April 19, 1995 Oklahoma City
bombing, which may be related to white private militia groups, revealed a deep-
seated hatred of the state by segments of the population, especially the syndrome
of the so-called angry white male who blames his economic and social difficulties
on state policies. He apparently seeks a new, as of yet undefined, social compact.
See generally TIME, May 8, 1995 (the issue largely covers militia groups, their
possible connection to the Oklahoma City bombing, and the rhetoric of right-wing
extremism prevalent in radio talk shows and among some Republican Party cir-
cles). In short, there is throughout the globe a heightened, and perhaps unprece-
dented, tension between state, individual, and society in modem times. See
Chester A. Crocker, The Global Law and Order Deficit: Is the West Ready to Police
the World's Bad Neighborhoods?, WASH. PosT, Dec. 20, 1992, at C1 (discussing the
"disorder" of the post-Cold War period and the need for a new Western-led regime
of processes and institutions to replace it).
2. As recently as a decade ago, it was inconceivable to imagine a world with-
out the bipolar, Soviet-American bloc phenomenon. Virtually all political, academic,
and policy discourses seemed trapped in that dialectic. If Washington and Moscow
appeared to be preoccupied with each other's intentions and policies-and fash-
ioned their domestic programs partially on that dynamic-the rest of the world
was even more attentive to whispers and rumors from those capitals. Perhaps in
no other continent was the weight of the Cold War more heavily felt than in
Africa. There, governments of the left and of the right could rise or fall based on
their execution of, or failure to execute, bloc interests. African states were captive
to a degree that, for all intents and purposes, negated the concept of sovereignty.
3. The false "stability" offered to the African post-colonial state by the Cold
War has been replaced by a vacuum, an unpatronized void, which has left ruling
elites exposed. Unable to support itself or demand the loyalty of its citizenry, the
state now faces collapse-if it already has not done so.
4. For a horrific account of Africa's problems, see Robert D. Kaplan, The
Coming Anarchy, ATIANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1994, at 44 (discussing the chaos that
he believes will inevitably result as governments in Africa and the underdeveloped
world implode because of disease, environmental degradation, and religious and
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The recent collapses of Liberia,5 Somalia,6 and Rwanda 7
have given urgency to analyses about the nature and viability
of African states. With over a dozen other states' facing the
risk of collapse, it would be irresponsible to pretend that the
post-colonial state is not in deep trouble, if not doomed. I.
William Zartman's Collapsed States: the Disintegration and
Restoration of Legitimate Authority,9 a collection of excellent
chapters by remarkable thinkers and keen students of African
affairs, is the first work to critically confront the crisis of the
African post-colonial state by examining in detail why and how
eleven African states are in danger of collapsing, if they have
not already done so, and how a number were brought back
from their ruins. The book also offers vehicles, termed here as
potential agents for reconstruction, for putting the collapsed
state back together. These predictable recipes for reform,
ethnic hatreds). For another apocalyptic account of global problems, see Matthew
Connelly & Paul Kennedy, Must it be the Rest Against the West?, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Dec. 1994, at 61 (arguing that the world's survival is threatened by
unbalanced wealth and resources, as well as unbalanced demographic trends, such
as a rich North and an increasingly poor but populous South, and that the only
way the North can save itself from being overrun by hungry hordes from the
South is through a new North-South deal that reduces poverty, birth rates, and
environmental degradation).
5. The Liberian state, a faithful client of the United States for at least a
century, collapsed in 1990 after rebel forces led by Charles Taylor attacked the
government of Samuel Doe, a brutally cruel military dictator. See generally LAW-
YERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, LIBERIA: A PROMISE BETRAYED (1986) (ex-
amining the repression of political dissent and the excessive use of military force
in the years preceding the rebellion); see also DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1990, at 192-93 (1991).
6. Somalia, under the personal dictatorship of Mohammed Siad Barre, col-
lapsed in 1991 when Barre was driven out of the capital, Mogadishu, by rebel
forces. His rule was especially abusive. See generally AFRICA WATCH, SOMALIA: A
GOVERNMENT AT WAR WITH ITS OWN PEOPLE (1990).
7. Rwanda collapsed in April 1994 after President Juvenal Habyarimana, a
Hutu, was killed in a mysterious plane crash. The Tutsi-dominated Rwanda Patri-
otic Front (RPF), which since 1990 had been at war with the government, de-
manding the return of Tutsi exiles and the introduction of democracy, then took
power in a genocidal war in which about 500,000 civilians were reportedly mur-
dered. Makau wa Mutua, U.N. Must Make Rwanda a Top Priority, OAKLAND
TRIB., May 25, 1994, at A13; Genocide in Rwanda: April-May 1994, HUM. RTS.
WATCH/AFR., May 1994, at 2.
8. States which could collapse include Zaire, Nigeria, Burundi, Sudan, Ango-
la, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Kenya, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, Togo, Algeria, and
Chad. This list is by no means exhaustive.
9. COLLAPSED STATES: THE DISINTEGRATION AND RESTORATION OF LEGITIMATE
AUTHORITY (I. William Zartman ed., 1995) [hereinafter COLLAPSED STATES].
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which include democratization, humanitarian responses
through the United Nations, foreign intervention, and the role
of "strongmen," form part of an increasingly deafening interna-
tional discourse on the subject. 10 The book is divided into four
thematic parts: 1) states that collapsed and were reconstruct-
ed; 2) states currently in collapse and in need of reconstruc-
tion; 3) states at risk of collapse; and 4) potential agents for
reconstruction.
Conceptually, Collapsed States takes as non-negotiable the
political landscape of Africa, particularly its states as constitut-
ed by colonial powers and confirmed by post-colonial elites. In
other words, the book sees as its major task the exploration of
the causes of state collapse, the symptoms and warning signs
of such an eventuality, and potential responses to such crises.
Fundamentally, Collapsed States is concerned with the restora-
tion of the status quo, defined in this case as the preservation
of the territorial integrity of the post-colonial state and its
sovereignty." In this review, I test the analytical and practi-
cal bases for this assumption and, by drawing from the excel-
lent case studies in the book, examine what the possible "sal-
vation" of the post-colonial state means in the context of de-
mands for freedom and prosperity by Africans. In the process, I
challenge the traditional conception-which drives the central
thesis of the book-that, as constituted, the African state must
be saved at all cost. Juxtaposed against the basic, ultimate
justifications for the existence of any state, namely, the guar-
antee of personal security and protection of property, 2 I ask
10. Most of these suggested responses for reconstruction imagine or call for a
proactive and central role by the industrial democracies of the West, presumably
the only states with the will and resources to preserve the global state system.
These prescriptions preoccupy UN agencies, the international development agencies
of industrialized countries, nongovernmental actors and institutions, and regional
inter-governmental organizations such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU).
11. Zartman writes that "[in the search for answers [about how to address
state collapse], it is first necessary to reaffirm that reconstruction of the sovereign
state is necessary." I. William Zartman, Putting Things Back Together, in COL-
LAPSED STATES, supra note 9, at 267. His full agenda is frankly revealed at the
end of the book when he categorically states that "except for the current case of
Ethiopia, there is not a case in this book for which a change in boundaries or
secession of a territory is a necessary condition of state restitution." Id. at 268.
12. My assumption here, put simply, is that organized political society should
exist for two basic reasons: the enhancement of individual and societal freedom
and the creation of conditions for the advancement of material progress. On this
basis, the state creates space in which individuals, defined either as singular units
508 [Vol. MX:2
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why an institution that has failed to meet both needs should
be reinstituted, even when incontrovertible evidence suggests
.that it has utterly failed. A state is not an end in itself but a
means to the creation of conditions for the happiness of the
highest possible number of people. When that basic premise is
violated, and is no longer the rationale for the existence of the
state, then it becomes questionable why anyone would advo-
cate the "redemption" of such an entity.
II. DIAGNOSIS FOR THE FAILURE OF THE POST-COLONIAL STATE
In his introduction, Zartman distinguishes state collapse
from "mere rebellion, coup, or riot."3 Rather, he defines it as
a "situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power),
law and political order have fallen apart."4 Although the phe-
nomenon is not peculiarly African, as evidenced by the collapse
of the Soviet Union and a number of other formerly communist
European states in the last six years, Zartman concedes it is
more prevalent in Africa. 5 Rejecting the hypothesis that state
collapse is a post-colonial phenomenon, Zartman isolates it to
"a condition of nationalist, second or later generation regimes
ruling over established (i.e., functioning) states." 6 This isola-
or communities, can free themselves from the deleterious effects of nature and the
despotic or abusive impulses of fellow beings. The state's despotic and abusive
tendencies are contained by individuals and society, and extreme individualism is
restrained by society, the state, and the common good.
13. I. William Zartman, Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse, in
COLLAPSED STATES, supra note 9, at 1.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 2.
16. Id. Zartman's neatly phrased reasoning is. problematic because he does not
explain why, if so many post-colonial African states have failed, state collapse is
not a post-colonial phenomenon. It is such assertions that create problems for the
central thesis of the book because they preclude a discussion of other reasons for
state failure. For example, Zartman excludes the failure of the Congolese (now
Zairian) post-colonial state in 1960-1961 from the phenomenon under examination
and claims that the Congo's failure was an exception to the "otherwise successful
transfer of authority from colonial to independent rule." Id. He argues that in the
Congo it was the colonial state that failed because state institutions failed to rec-
ognize each other. Id. In fact, the collapse of the post-colonial Zairian state was
only more immediate because the contradictions within its predecessor, the colonial
state, were sharper, and external interference more acute, than in other cases on
the continent. The Congo was so large and underdeveloped at independence that it
lacked a viable state infrastructure and leadership with a modicum or even pre-
tense of national cohesion. To make matters worse, a Belgian-led secessionist effort
in the mineral-rich Katanga and the murder of Patrice Lumumba, the country's
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tion appears to be false because similar problems were later
responsible for state collapse elsewhere in Africa.' The same
could be true of his observation that state collapse has oc-
curred in two basic waves: from the late 1970s until the early
1980s and in the late 1980s until today. This author holds the
view that state collapse has been a gradual process that start-
ed with independence and continues to the present, with the
actual physical collapse as mere evidence of moral and political
decay that has its roots in the nature of the state.
Discussing the concept of state collapse, Zartman correctly
points out that the phenomenon occurs because states "can no
longer perform the functions required for them to pass as
states."5 A state only exists if it can exercise sovereign au-
thority over a territory and a defined population.' 9 According
to Zartman:
This definition focuses on three functions: the state as the
first democratically-elected prime minister, in which the American CIA and
Mobutu Sese Seko were implicated, brought the state down. See LAWYERS COMMIT-
TEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ZAIRE: REPRESSION As POLIcY 15-17 (1990); Stephen
Weissman, The CIA and US Policy in Zaire and Angola, in AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE STAKES AND THE STANCE 381, 383-432 (Ren
Lemarchand ed., 1978); SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, AL-
LEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS, S. Doc. No. 465, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., 14-15 (1975). Similar conditions partially contributed to state
collapse elsewhere on the continent in the 1970s.
17. In any case, Zartman's assertion that state collapse occurred in situations
of "established" and "functioning" states is somewhat of an exaggeration, to say
the least. Even today, nearly four decades into post-colonialism, those terms-"estab-
lished" and "functioning"-ring false when applied to African statehood. If the terms
imply internal legitimacy, a distinct national identity and consciousness, and the
unrivaled ability to command the loyalty and obedience of the citizenry for the
purposes of running the state, then Zartman could not be further off the mark,
particularly if he refers to African states in the 1970s and the 1980s. Many of the
states on the continent had begun to fail even before they were consolidated. See
Michael Bratton, Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa,
41 WORLD POL. 407, 409 (1989). Gilbert Khadiagala argues, in the case of Uganda,
that "Idi Amain [the military dictator who ruled from 1971-1979] destroyed a state
that was still being made, a state groping with rudimentary tasks of broadening
its authority over an uncertain territory, against a background of scarce resources
and unrefined administration." Gilbert M. Khadiagala, State Collapse and Recon-
struction in Uganda, in COLLAPSED STATES, supra note 9, at 35.
18. Zartman, Introduction, supra note 13, at 5.
19. Under extant international law, a state "is an entity that has a defined
territory and a permanent population, under the control of its own government,
and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other
such entities." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (Am. Law Inst. 1986).
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sovereign authority-the accepted source of identity and the
arena of politics; the state as an institution-and therefore a
tangible organization of decisionmaking and an intangible
symbol of identity; and the state as the security guarantor for
a populated territory. Because these functions are so inter-
twined, it becomes difficult to perform them separately: a
weakening of one function drags down others with it. It also
becomes difficult to establish an absolute threshold of col-
lapse. °
The state then collapses when it is unable to perform this
trilogy of functions and when the following characteristics
become manifest. First, as a decision-maker, it becomes para-
lyzed and cannot make laws or preserve order.2' Second, it
fails as a "symbol of identity" and cannot confer "a name on its
people and a meaning to their social action."22 Third, it fails
when its territory is not protected by a central sovereign pow-
er.' Fourth, it fails to organize the economy and is completely
unable to give coherence to socio-economic relations.24 Finally,
it is not able to receive or demand support from the citizenry
and, as a result, is no longer the target of the people's de-
mands.' Such a state cannot govern and has "lost the right to
rule."' This descriptive catalogue still does not say why the
state fails. Zartman's explanation again begs the question.
In his attempts to explain the phenomenon, Zartman asks
whether the state collapsed because it was the "wrong institu-
tion" or because it was not "appropriately African." ' He re-







27. Id. at 6. These questions appear designed to silence the thought that
there could be something inherently wrong with the post-colonial state. Zartman
implausibly argues that no central theme runs through all the cases of collapsed
states. If that is the case, I do not know how he can account for fairly obvious de-
fining characteristics of the African post-colonial state, especially the failed ones,
such as alienated elites who have not articulated a coherent national interest, a
generally despotic state resentful of any functioning and independent civil society,
and an undefined national identity on the part of the citizenry, to mention a few.
For an impressively analytical work on the tyranny and alienation of the post-colo-
nial state from civil society in Africa, and Zaire in particular, see MICHAEL G.
SCHATZBERG, THE DIALEcTIcs OF OPPRESSION IN ZAIRE (1988).
1995]
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sponds in the negative in both instances although he admits
that the state's poor performance of the functions of statehood,
such as "representation, interest articulation, [and] output
efficiency" contribute to the collapseY But he concludes that
tyranny and the authoritarianism of the "hard state"9 are
reasons for its collapse. The rest of Zartman's introductory
chapter is devoted to how the state collapses, with no further
discussion of why it collapses.
The authors of the succeeding chapters-whose case stud-
ies cover Chad, Uganda, Ghana, Somalia, Liberia, Mozam-
bique, Ethiopia, Angola, Zaire, Algeria, and South Africa-do a
better job of disaggregating the reasons for state collapse amid
complicated and troubled national histories. A thoughtful ex-
planation is offered by Barry Schutz in his examination of the
struggle for statehood in Mozambique:
States collapse, or fragment, when their foundations of legiti-
macy, reposing in civil society, become frayed and torn. New
states that have recently acquired independence are especial-
ly vulnerable to collapse because the principles of governmen-
tal legitimacy have yet to be fully espoused or understood,
due to an inchoate sense of nationhood. 0
Schutz notes that FreLiMo"1 tried hard to inculcate a
sense of nationhood in the population during its fourteen year
armed struggle. However, the sheer size of the country, its
underdeveloped state, and its ethnic diversity precluded the
formation of a resilient national identity. He writes further
that:
Too often we assume the existence of a state. The interna-
tional community is presently enmeshed in a struggle to
maintain the existence of states whose legitimacy (as states)
has crumbled. All states are creations of conflict, consensus,
28. Zartman, Introduction, supra note 13, at 6.
29. In the hard state, tyranny is institutionalized and coercion becomes public
policy. As a consequence, the citizenry, as in apartheid South Africa and the for-
mer Soviet Union, does not provide the state with its "allegiance and legitimizing
support." Id. at 7.
30. Barry Schutz, The Heritage of Revolution and the Struggle for Governmen-
tal Legitimacy in Mozambique, in COLLAPSED STATES, supra note 9, at 109.
31. "FreLiMo" is the Portuguese acronym for the Front for the Liberation of
Mozambique, the liberation movement that in 1974 overthrew over 300 years of
Portuguese colonialism in the east African country. Id. at 110.
512 [Vol. MX:2
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and contrivance, but perhaps the states of Africa are the most
contrived of all. In very few circumstances were the states
formed on the basis of internal dynamics. Most of them were
configured by the imperatives of European power politics at
the end of the nineteenth century. As a result, African states
are especially subject to fragmentation and reconfiguration
based on the claims and consequences of internal dispute and
the conflict and external ambitions and operations.2
In the case of colonial Mozambique, the above factors,
coupled with the lack of a developed civil society and an ex-
tremely inept colonial power, left behind a dispersed, uncon-
nected, and decentralized population. Incipient national identi-
ty, if any existed, was at its very rudimentary stages. In such
circumstances, the post-colonial state was at a great disadvan-
tage in its attempt to cultivate political legitimacy. This task
was further complicated by its radical, coercive policies and the
destabilization campaigns of Rhodesia and apartheid South
Africa.3 This combination of events and the civil war started
by RENAMO34 served to bankrupt the fragile economy and
32. Schutz, supra note 30, at 112 (emphasis added). Schutz adds that:
Mozambique is no exception to this pattern. It was created by Portuguese
interest, expanded by Portuguese appetite, and territorially configured by
the interests of the international [European] community of states, notably
Portugal and Great Britain. Mozambique's present borders were interna-
tionally legitimized by Cecil Rhodes's refusal to annex Mozambique to the
(then) Rhodesias after his deputy, Starr Jameson, led an unauthorized
Rhodesian expedition into Mozambique in 1893 in order to claim it for
the British Crown. Rhodes did not believe it was necessary to annex
Mozambique in order to dominate it. This pattern of global and regional
hegemony over Mozambique persists to the present.
Id.
33. Although initially the FreLiMo government attempted to buy legitimacy by
extending educational and health services to regions of the country which had
hitherto been neglected and exploited, in 1977 it reversed course and adopted
doctrinaire Marxism. According to Schutz:
That was the year FreLiMo made its fateful decision to adopt a hard,
radical Marxist-Leninist approach and to enlist the support of the Soviet
Union and its bloc in this process .... But the decision to impose a
radical, collectivizing, rapidly industrializing policy with no room for grad-
ualism initiated a series of events that alienated the population, dried up
the availability of consumer goods, created greater dependency on the
Soviet bloc, and, worst of all, elicited fear and provocation in the govern-
ments of Rhodesia, South Africa, and ultimately, the United States.
Id. at 114.
34. Soon after its independence, the FreLiMo government granted refuge and
bases to Zimbabwean liberation movements fighting against the Ian Smith regime
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caused the state to collapse. In his excellent contribution on
Mozambique, Schutz goes beyond a superficial descriptive ap-
proach and successfully attempts to pinpoint why the state
collapsed. Unlike Zartman, he locates the reasons in the na-
ture of the colonial and post-colonial state.
Michael Foltz makes a less determined case in his contri-
bution on Chad, although his discussion of reconstruction is
very detailed and informative.' This chapter, which focuses
primarily on the reconstruction of the state, notes that the
"absence of large-scale solidaristic structures"' contributed to
state collapse. He lists these structures as the country's "ethni-
cally diverse social mosaics,"" the further segmentation of
ethnic groups,' religion, and regionalism.39 But these char-
in Rhodesia. The white Rhodesian army in turn increased its raids in Mozambique
and orchestrated the creation of RENAMO, the Portuguese acronym for the
Mozambican National Resistance (MNR), a collection of colonists opposed to
FreLiMo. In 1980, upon independence, the Robert Mugabe government in Zimba-
bwe cut its links to RENAMO which then became South Africa's client. Under
South African patronage, RENAMO became an effective fighting force whose bru-
tality over innocent civilians was unmatched until it agreed to a ceasefire in 1992.
FENAMO took part in the country's first contested elections in October 1994 and
forms the official opposition. See id. at 116-19.
35. William J. Foltz, Reconstructing the State of Chad, in COLLAPSED STATES,
supra note 9, at 15.
36. Id. at 16.
37. Id. at 16-17. Prior to its creation by the French as a state in the nine-
teenth century, the area now known as Chad was composed, as was the rest of
Africa, of indigenous states and political organizations, made up usually of the
same ethnic or linguistic communities. The country's five million people are drawn
from between 72 to 110 language groups. See id. at 116 (citing JEAN CHAPELLE,
LE PEUPLE TCHADIEN: SES RACINES, SA VIE QUOTIDIENNE, SES COMBATS (1980)).
38. He notes, in what I think is a typically Western description of African
ethnicity, that "it would be unusual for a whole linguistic or ethnic group to mobi-
lize behind a single leader or cause." Id. at 17. I suspect that this observation is
a mischaracterization of the form of individualism prompted by the nomadic cul-
tures prevalent in the region. Left the way Foltz states it, it leaves the impression
of an unruly, anarchic people, incapable of social organization. This image of a
warlike people is underlined by Foltz's observation that "in the north [of Chad],
among the Tubu and related peoples like the Bideyat and Zaghawa, fighting prow-
ess is a normal and practiced male attribute, with feuds an integral part of social
life." Id. at 18 (citing CATHERINE BAROIN, ANARCHIE ET COHISION SOCIALE CHEZ
LES TOUBOU (1985)). This is an interesting, if not offensive observation. To charge
the Chadian peoples with a unique love for warfare, and then to attribute it to
state collapse, crosses the boundary of good scholarship. Can a similar charge be
laid at the door of the English, who for centuries dominated the world through
violence, or the Germans, who were key authors in two of the worst wars that
humankind has ever known? Or even early European settlers in the Americas who
wiped out virtually entire indigenous populations? Resentment about a totalizing
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acteristics alone, which are present in other African societies,
do not explain why Chad collapsed. In 1965, barely five years
after independence from France," the state was engulfed in
active revolt as peasants protested what Foltz calls an "over-
bearing, venal, and incompetent administration."' The state
was unable to contain the localized revolt and soon the whole
country was overtaken by civil strife which led to state col-
lapse." What collapsed was an incoherent and undefined po-
litical organization, headed by a narrow elite which was in
charge of a people and a territory who did not identify with it.
The discussion on Ghana by Donald Rothchild" spells out
the state contraction mode 4 of state collapse, and uses it to
explain why and how the Ghanaian state collapsed. After the
overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah, the charismatic first Ghanaian
head of state in 1966,"5 three highly authoritarian military
dictatorships ruled over the state until control was transferred
central authority is one thing, anarchy quite another. Foltz is right, however,
when he notes that "[slocial segmentation accentuated the tendency toward faction-
alism in political and military organization." Id. at 17. Although it is important to
note here that, in the context of the post-colonial state, social segmentation does
not take place in a vacuum; it partially continues because the state manipulates
ethnicity and other social cleavages or fails to create other, more unifying, or
countervailing, identities.
39. Id. at 17-18. Moreover, Islamic, Christian, and African religions among
other factors have contributed to the shifting alliances in the history of Chadian
post-colonialism.
40. Chad became an independent state in 1960. 3 NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITAN-
NICA 51 (15th ed. 1994).
41. Foltz, supra note 35, at 15.
42. Id.
43. Donald Rothchild, Rawlings and the Engineering of Legitimacy in Ghana,
in COLLAPSED STATES, supra note 9, at 49.
44. This model talks about state deterioration from within, as opposed to the
societal conflict model in which non-state, societal actors limit, isolate, and
marginalize the state, eventually destroying the center, but are unable to fill it. In
the contraction model, wracked by its own incapacity, the "state is unable to offer
effective leadership; it loses credibility as a political and economic manager. Its
effectiveness or 'collapse' is more a consequence of its own decline and general
incapacity to govern than an inability to cope with the pressures of powerful
counterelites" Id.
45. Frank Agyekum, Ghana-Politics: Pan-Africanist Star on the Wane, Inter
Press Service, June 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, INPRES File;
Ghana Inaugurates Nuclear Reactor, Xinhua News Agency, Mar. 9, 1995, available
in LEXIS, World Library, XIN-UJA File; Philip Sweeney, Symphonies for a Conti-
nent: The Pan African Orchestra Uses Native Instruments to Create a Novel Sound,
INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 9, 1994, at 20.
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to the elected civilian government of Hilla Limann in 1979.46
Continuing a generalized state collapse which had preceded his
rule, Limann witnessed the implosion of his state barely two
years later.47 Steep declines in revenue and the regime's un-
willingness to forge alliances with major societal groups pre-
cluded its ability to acquire legitimacy." In the end, the state
was destroyed because it was alienated from Ghanaian soci-
ety.49
Problems of state alienation from society, economic crises,
and religious tensions caused the collapse of Algeria ° and
Liberia,51 while the gradual but managed succession52 of the
apartheid state in South Africa resulted from its inherent
illegitimacy and its inability to continue to function as the
guarantor of the interests of a racist minority and the oppres-
sor of the black majority. 3 In the case of Ethiopia,' pro-
longed periods of tyranny55 have denied the state legitimacy,
46. Rothchild, supra note 9, at 52.
47. Id. at 54-55.
48. Id. at 53-54.
49. Id. at 50-55.
50. Azzedine Layachi, Algeria: Reinstating the State or Instating Civil Society,
in COLLAPSED STATES, supra note 9, at 171.
51. Martin Lowenkopf, Liberia: Putting the State Back Together, in COLLAPSED
STATES, supra note 9, at 91. The brutal regime of Samuel Doe, which took over in
a military coup from the detached Americo-Liberian ruling elite in 1980, was itself
torn apart when it could not contain an insurgency in 1990.
52. I prefer the term "succession" of the state to "collapse" because I think it
is too early to say whether the apartheid state has definitively collapsed, particu-
larly when in general terms racially driven economic inequalities-the purpose and
legacy of apartheid-remain roughly the same as before. The so-called post-apart-
heid state objectively protects those inequalities even as it attempts to implement
social and economic programs to reverse the condition. But states cannot be judged
merely on the basis of abstract policies, laws, or intentions; rather, it is the es-
sence of social and economic relations that count.
53. Sipho Shezi, South Africa: State Transition and the Management of Col-
lapse, in COLLAPSED STATES, supra note 9, at 191.
54. Edmond Keller, Remaking the Ethiopian State, in COLLAPSED STATES,
supra note 9, at 125.
55. The Ethiopian empire was woven together through the conquest of diverse
nations. However, from the very early days of the state, whose genesis goes back
over two millennia:
There were no meaningful efforts to integrate the broad masses of sub-
ject peoples into the expanded political system, except to forcibly impose
Amhara-Christian culture upon them and to extract economic resources
from them. This in large measure inhibited the development of a sense
of Ethiopian national identity among the people of the southern periph-
ery.
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while the civil war in Angola 6 has not given the state a
chance to attempt its own legitimation. In Zaire, one of the
most depressing cases on the continent, the dictator Mobutu
Sese Seko refuses to allow any attempt at state reconstruction,
although his country has collapsed owing to its inability to
perform virtually all the functions of statehood, except perpetu-
ate his tenure as dictator.57 The 1994 collapse of Rwanda,
which came too late for Collapsed States, is perhaps the most
tragic failure of a state. Among other factors, the manipulation
of ethnicity by Belgium, Rwanda's former colonial power, con-
tributed to the polarization of Hutu-Tutsi relations and partial-
ly led to the intensification of the hatreds which sparked geno-
cidal massacres."
Excellent as the case studies in Collapsed States are, they
generally neglect to place the failure of the post-colonial Afri-
Id. at 127.
Elsewhere in the country, the same pattern was repeated. "For the most
part, Haile Selassie [Emperor until his overthrow by a military junta led by
Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1974] was able to repress sentiments for self-determi-
nation among the Oromos [the country's largest ethnic group], Somalis, and Afar
throughout his reign, largely with the aid and military and economic assistance of
the United States." Id. at 126-27. The Tigrayan and Eritrean secessionist move-
ments overthrew the brutal dictatorship of Mengistu Haile Mariam, who had con-
tinued the suppression of non-Amhara groups, as well as dissident Amharas, under
the veneer of Marxist-Leninism, in 1991. Id. While the Eritreans established their
own sovereign state in 1994, the Tigrayans took over the collapsed Ethiopian
state, and are reconstructing it, regretfully, by cynically manipulating ethnicity.
See Keller, supra note 54, at 132-39; see also Makau wa Mutua, The New Oligar-
chy, AnR. REP., Sept.-Oct., 1993, at 27-31 (discussing the increasing despotism of
the ruling Tigrayan elite and their ethnically-driven divide and rule strategy).
56. Leonid L. Fituni, The Collapse of the Socialist State: Angola and the Sovi-
et Union, in COLLAPSED STATES, supra note 9, at 143.
57. Herbert Weiss, Zaire: Collapsed Society, Surviving State, Future Policy, in
COLLAPSED STATES, supra note 9, at 157. Pressure for democratic reform led to a
national conference which stripped Mobutu Sese Seko of virtually all power in
1992. However, he defied the conference and has continued to rule through his
control of the military without any constitutional basis. The state has been com-
pletely paralyzed and it could break apart at any time. See Zaire: Violence Against
Democracy, AMNESTY INL (London), Sept. 16, 1993, at 1.
58. Ali Mazrui, the renowned academic, has written that "[e]thnic duality
without regional separation can be a prescription for hate at close quarters.
Rwanda's and Burundi's tragedies are a combination of ethnic duality, population
density, geographic intermingling and the legacies of colonial and pre-colonial rela-
tionships." Ali Mazrui, The African State as a Political Refugee: Institutional Col-
lapse and Human Displacement 13 (Sept. 8-10, 1994) (paper given at the Sympo-
sium on Refugees and Forced Population Displacements in Africa, Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, on file with author) [hereinafter African State as Refugee].
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can state where it should truly rest, within the dynamic of
post-colonialism and the inability of the colonial state to meta-
morphose into a viable and prosperous political and social
organization. Although one can read patterns in the case stud-
ies and their attempts to rationalize recurrent problems as
particularized crises, there is little meaning in failing to admit
what has today become an obvious reality: across the African
continent, almost without exception, the post-colonial state has
been in gradual decay from the time of its inception. Rather
than make excuses for it, I prefer to directly confront the post-
colonial African state, critically examine its nature, and deter-
mine why it has been such a disappointment.
The "Scramble for Africa," purportedly given "legal" cover
by the 1885 Berlin Conference,59 which was driven by the
need for raw materials and markets for European capitalism,
is responsible for the imposition of the modern state on Afri-
ca. 0 Once European powers had agreed on "spheres of influ-
ence," effective occupation was achieved through wars of con-
quest or fraudulent treaties of "protection" with rulers of pre-
colonial African states and communities.6 After such con-
quest-which took the last two decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury-the imposition of the colonial state was effected, usually
by combining, arbitrarily, several pre-existing pre-colonial
states or communities. By the turn of the century, thousands of
previously sovereign and independent political entities were
compressed into about forty completely new and uniquely arti-
59. The conference was put together to harmonize imperialist desires and
avoid war among the major powers ,of Europe. The unexpected French takeover of
Algeria in 1830, the British seizure of Egypt and the Suez Canal, King Leopold's
[of Belgium] claim over large chunks of land in central Africa, and Germany's
intentions of occupying colonies of her own necessitated a forum to divide up the
African continent. See BASIL DAVIDSON, AFRICA IN HISTORY 283-84 (1991).
60. Crawford Young, The Heritage of Colonialism, in AFRICA IN WORLD POLI-
TICS 19 (John W. Harbeson & Donald Rothchild eds., 1991). Describing the
"Scramble," Young writes that "Africa . . . was a ripe melon awaiting carv-
ing .... Those who scrambled [the] fastest won the largest slices and the right
to consume at their leisure the sweet, succulent flesh. Stragglers snatched only
small servings or tasteless portions; Italians, for example, found only desserts on
their plates." Id. at 19.
61. In many cases, colonization was achieved through a "process of infiltration,
steadily advanced until the stage of 'effective occupation' could be reached, behind
the screen of [fraudulent] 'treaties of protection'. These were 'signed' with one or
another European power by chiefs who could seldom or never understood the in-




In creating the new states, European powers treated Afri-
ca as terra nullius or no-man's land, which is territory that
belongs to no one because it is uninhabited and unclaimed.
The chilling words of a British official are telling:
In those days we just took a blue pencil and a rule, and we
put it at Old Calabar, and drew that blue line to Yola .... I
recollect thinking when I was sitting having an audience
with the Emir [of YolaI, surrounded by his tribe, that it was
a very good thing that he did not know that I, with a blue
pencil, had drawn a line through his territory."
No attention was paid to pre-colonial inter-
state/community relations in the creation of the new states. In
a number of instances, the same community was split between
two or more new states, destroying its physical integrity. The
cases of the east African Masai and the west African Ewe are
two of the most notorious ones.64 Ian Brownlie has written:
Within a framework of political bargaining [between imperi-
alist rivals], the accidents of prior exploration and military
penetration were often to determine delimitation as between
Britain, France, and Germany. Thus was the map of West
Africa drawn. In any case lines were commonly drawn on
maps at a stage when there was no great knowledge of the
region concerned. The boundaries which emerged were gener-
ally based upon geographical features, especially rivers and
62. Only a few states retained a semblance of their pre-colonial territorial
identities: Botswana, Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Morocco,
Rwanda, Swaziland, and Tunisia. See Young, supra note 60, at 19.
63. J. C. ANENE, THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES OF NIGERIA 1885-1960: THE
FRAMEWORK OF AN EMERGENT NATION 3-4 (1970) (quoting The Geographical Jour-
nal, vol. xxviii, Proceedings, March 9, 1914) (the official quoted was involved in
the creation of the boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon). A more remarkable
admission was made by Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister, at a dinner in
1890 following the conclusion of the Anglo-French Convention which established
'spheres of influence" in west Africa. He stated:
We have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white
man's foot ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers
and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small impediment that we
never knew exactly where the mountains and the rivers and lakes were.
Id. at 3.
64. The Masai were split between Kenya and Tanganyika [Tanzania] and the
Ewe between Togo and Ghana. See IAN BROWNLIE, AFRICAN BOUNDARIES: A LEGAL
AND DIPLOMATIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 6 (1979).
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watersheds, and astronomical or geometric lines."
In other cases, communities with a history of tension and
even war between them were coerced into living together in
the new state. Except for the piece by Barry Schutz and, to
some extent, Gilbert Khadiagala," Collapsed States does not
relate the failure of the post-colonial state to its contrived
beginning and the colonial policies which served to disarticu-
late any sense of nationhood6' that might have developed.
Zartman explicitly rejects this line of reasoning when he states
that state collapse is not a post-colonial phenomenon." The
argument that only states created through consensus or other
less violent methods can be viable is ridiculous for obvious
reasons. But it is legitimate to inquire whether states born out
of the forceful dismantlement of sovereign and independent
entities, and then coercively amalgamated into unitary, for-
eign-ruled states, without any regard whatsoever for extant
economic, demographic, cultural, linguistic, religious, and other
social factors, could indeed cohere69 into viable entities. ° It
is too demeaning to Africa to assume that pre-colonial national
identities have been irreversibly trumped by the colonial
state.7'
65. Id.
66. See Schutz, supra note 30; see also Khadiagala, supra note 18.
67. Colonialism imposed a perverted "unity" on Africans through the central-
ized state because Africans saw themselves as victims of an oppressive, racist
outsider. As Julius Nyerere noted: "colonization had one significant result. A senti-
ment was created on the African continent-a sentiment of oneness." Julius K.
Nyerere, Africa's Place in the World, in SYMPOSIUM ON AFRICA 149 (1960) (discuss-
ing Africa's aspirations and changing political status on the eve of massive decol-
onization). But what Nyerere failed to mention was the "disunity" fostered by
colonial policies, a legacy that today spells doom for the post-colonial state.
68. Zartman, Introduction, supra note 13, at 2.
69. Unlike most states elsewhere, African states and the borders which con-
tain them are not 'the visible expression of the age-long efforts of [African] peo-
ples to achieve political adjustment between themselves and the physical condi-
tions in which they live." THE CHANGING WORLD: STUDIES IN POLITICAL GEOGRA-
PHY 54 (W. Gordon East & A.E. Moodie eds., 1956).
70. According to Barry Schutz, African states are the most contrived of all
states and are therefore especially vulnerable to internal conflicts because of an
underdeveloped or undeveloped sense of nationhood. See Schutz, supra note 30, at
112-13.
71. A equivalent analogy would be a hypothetical nineteenth century conquest
of European states by imperial African states and the forceful combination of, say,
Germany and France into Europa, a unitary colonial state. If, after one century of
foreign African rule, Europa was decolonized as one entity, it is very difficult to
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Collapsed States should have inquired as to what colonial
policies reveal about that state and its successor. Perhaps no
other policy was more inimical to the creation of a national
consciousness among Africans than that of divide and rule.
This strategy, which favored one nation or community at the
expense of others, was designed to divide the population to
make it easier to rule and exploit. The colonial state employed
it in every sphere of life, pitting groups against each other and
heightening ethnic tensions. Rwanda,72 which is the latest
post-colonial state to collapse, offers a vivid example of how the
policy has worked. Dixon Kamukama has succinctly captured
the policy in the following language:
First, they [the Belgians] helped king Musinga [a Tutsi] to
consolidate his power on the pretext that the Tutsi were de
facto rulers. They took up most of the pre-colonial state ma-
chinery and functionaries and used it under the mantle of
indirect rule.... As a result of this colonial policy, by the
1950's the Tutsi held 43 Chiefdoms, 549 out of the 559 sub-
chief positions, 83% of posts in such areas as the judiciary,
agriculture and veterinary services.73
Such favoritism, which frequently led to sharp animosi-
ties,"4 was commonplace. In Uganda, the Buganda 5 were
used by the British to carry out punitive expeditions against
their neighbors in return for more territory.76 Uneven devel-
see how it could be viable, even for one year.
72. Before the collapse of Rwanda in 1994, over 85% of the population was
Hutu, about 12% Tutsi, and 1% Twa. Mutua, supra note 8, at A13. Prior to the
arrival of the Belgian colonialists, the Tutsi ruled over the Hutu in a feudal-client
relationship. Id. The distinctions between the three groups are not ethnic, but
scholars disagree as to whether they are sub-groups, classes, or castes. Id. At any
rate, the genocidal massacres prevalent today appear to have been partially caused
by the manipulative colonial rule which sought to exploit social cleavages between
the Hutu and the Tutsi. Id.
73. DIXON KAMUKAMA, RWANDA CONFLICT: ITS ROOTS AND REGIONAL IMPLICA-
TIONS 21 (1993).
74. In the case of Rwanda, the Hutus rose up against the repressive Tutsi-
Belgian rule in 1959. See Mutua, supra note 7, at A13. Many Tutsis were killed
in that successful nationalist revolt. Id. The Belgians quickly switched sides, abol-
ished the authoritarian monarchy, and granted the country independence in 1962
under Gregoire Kayibanda, a Hutu. Id. In a reversal of fortunes, the Tutsi took
power in 1994. Id.
75. The Buganda Kingdom was one of the most established pre-colonial states.
See ROLAND OLIVER & ANTHONY ATMORE, AFRICA SINCE 1800, at 18, 24 (1967).
76. Id. at 152.
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opment between regions, lack of administrative and other links
between different communities, and emphasis on educating
petty bureaucrats who ordinarily owed allegiance only to the
colonial state did nothing to foster a national identity. In fact,
the struggle to end colonialism was the one sentiment that
seemed to create unity. But as history has now shown, that
unity was not sufficient to imprint indelibly a national con-
sciousness.
The contrived state-and its concocted citizenry-are cen-
tral problems in state failure. What most of the authors in
Collapsed States see as weak states are entities that never
developed into nation-states. Almost universally throughout
Africa, the post-colonial state has failed to wrest the loyalties
of its citizens from pre-colonial identities." Neither the gover-
nors nor the governed have a deep consciousness about the
"nation." According to Robert Jackson, this rootlessness is
evident in the post-colonial state:
Citizenship means little, and carries few substantial rights or
duties compared with membership in a family, clan, religious
sect or ethnic community. Often the 'government! cannot
govern itself, and its officials may in fact be freelancers,
charging what amounts to a private fee for their services.
The language of the state may be little more than a facade
for the advancement of personal or factional interests by peo-
•ple who are only nominally judges, soldiers, bureaucrats,
policemen or members of some other official category. In
short, many states in sub-Saharan Africa are far from credi-
77. Art Hansen has put the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of transforming
the colonial state into a viable state in a powerful passage:
The term "nation" refers to a group that shares a common history and
identity and is aware of that; they are a people, not just a population.
Using that definition, ethnic groups (once called tribes) in Africa are also
nations. None of the new African states were originally nation-
states .... Each of the new states contains more than one nation. In
their border areas, many new states contain parts of nations because the
European-inspired borders cut across existing national territories. Thus
one of the major tasks confronting the leaders of the new African states
was creating nations. This task was often referred to as creating a nation-
al consciousness, but that was misleading. There was no nation to become
conscious of; the nation had to be created concurrently with a conscious-
ness.
Art Hansen, African Refugees: Defining and Defending Their Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA 139, 161-62 (Ronald Cohen et al. eds.,
1993) (emphasis added).
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ble realities.7"
The problem then is not that African states are weak, but
that they were never real in the first place. Yet, despite their
inability to become real nations, develop economically, and win
the allegiance of their populations, during the cold war African
post-colonial states, even when they failed, usually found ex-
ternal patrons to prop them up again.79 In fact, the most suc-
cessful enterprise of the post-colonial state has been the pres-
ervation of Africa's colonial map, through the sacralization of
colonial borders. Indeed, until Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia in
1993, there had not been a single case of the dismemberment
of an African state." The boundaries created by Europeans
had been preserved intact by African states and their interna-
tional patrons81  at all costs. 2  Africa's "ramshackle re-
gimes, '8 3 as Robert Jackson calls them, have been able to sur-
vive for so long primarily because they had juridical,84 though
78. Robert Jackson, Juridical Statehood in Sub-Saharan Africa, 46 J. INTL
AFF. 1 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
79. Most of the states which collapsed during the Cold War were reconstruct-
ed, if only to become marginally functional, and present a facade of sovereignty. In
addition to Zaire, Ghana, and Uganda, Chad is perhaps the best example. Accord-
ing to Jackson:
Within sub-Saharan Africa, numerous marginal states have been created
that survive primarily by juridical statehood and possess very limited
substance or credibility. Chad is the paradigmatic case: It is virtually
devoid of political or socioeconomic concreteness, and it has survived
almost entirely by external recognition and support, mainly from France.
Id. at 8-9.
80. See Victor T. Le Vime, Africa's Problems Aren't All the Colonists' Fault,
HOUST. CHRON., Dec. 5, 1994, at 19; Jonathan Power, Violence Doesn't Always
Have to Rule, CALGARY HERALD, May 1, 1993, at A4; Keith B. Richburg, Fall of
African Dictatorships Fuels Separatist Feeling, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1992, at Al.
81. For example, when the Zairian state was threatened with dismemberment
by the Shaba rebellions of 1977 and 1978, Mobutu Sese Seko's regime was saved
by the military intervention of France and Belgium with U.S. logistical support.
See Weiss, supra note 57, at 167.
82. See Jeffrey Herbst, Challenges to Africa's Boundaries in the New World
Order, 46 J. INT' AFF. 17, 18-21 (1992).
83. Robert Jackson uses the term to describe regimes "whose writ often does
not extend throughout the country; where it does, it is observed irregularly." Jack-
son, supra note 57, at 1.
84. Put simply, juridical statehood refers to political independence, a condition
that may have nothing to do with the ability of a state to discharge the functions
of statehood. Applied to Africa, it means that decolonization gave international
status and legitimacy to colonial entities without regard to their internal legitima-
cy. Robert Jackson notes that juridical statehood has little to do with "national
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not empirical,' statehood. In sum, international legitimacy
made up for internal illegitimacy.
During the cold war, African states were kept afloat by
patronage from either the East or the West. As the case stud-
ies in Collapsed States indicate, none of the states discussed
could have survived without external economic and military
support. Highly despotic, alienated,, and hopelessly divided
along ethnic, regional, class, and religious lines-and devoid of
a national identity-many states failed or teetered on the
brink of collapse. Unable to provide conditions for economic
prosperity, post-colonial states lost whatever "pre-legitima-
cy""6 they may have carried over from the struggle for decolo-
nization. More than any particular problems in certain
states-which in any case are manifestations of the basic invi-
ability of the post-colonial state-trends emerge in the exami-
nation of Africa's multiple crises. While Collapsed States does a
great job of describing what those crises are, and how they
have come about, it is remiss in its diagnostic function. Se-
duced by the need to maintain the international state system,
and in particular its African variant, many of the authors
identity, political capability, military power, national wealth, bureaucratic efficien-
cy, an educated citizenry, historical precedent or any other empirical criterion. It
is a question solely of the categorical right of a colonial dependency to statehood."
Id. at 5. While I emphatically reject the notion that the lack of these empirical at-
tributes justifies colonialism, which I regard as immoral and illegal from its con-
ception, I question what right the West had in formulating self-determination as a
right only exercisable by colonial states and not the pre-colonial states and com-
munities subject to the colonial states. International law only allowed the decoloni-
zation of the colonial state as a unit. The exercise of that right by different pre-
colonial entities and peoples was not contemplated. This logic ratified colonial
borders and the states bounded thereby, and legitimized the denial of sovereignty
to pre-colonial, independent African states and communities. In effect, it extended
the principle of uti possidetis juris, the Latin American linkage between self-deter-
mination and the colonial states [administrative units] of the Spanish Empire, to
Africa. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 137-38 (3d
ed. 1979).
85. Ali Mazrui has listed the six characteristics of the empirical statehood as:
sovereign control over territory; sovereign control and oversight of the territory's
resources; effective and rational extraction of revenue from citizens, goods, and ser-
vices; the construction and maintenance of an adequate national infrastructure;
ability to provide basic services; and the capacity to maintain law and order. See
Mazrui, supra note 58, at 4.
86. Ferrero defined pro-legitimacy as the stage and process through which an
initial government seeks to establish its legitimacy internally. See generally
GIGLIERMO FERRERO, PRINCIPLES OF POWER: THE GREAT POLITICAL CRISES OF HIS-
TORY (Theodore R. Jaeckel trans., 1942); see also Schutz, supra note 30, at 110.
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retreat from asking the hard questions about African state-
hood, I suspect, because the scenarios conjured are very dis-
turbing. For example, what next if they argue that the post-
colonial state is simply invalid, incapable of redemption or
salvation? Does that mean the crusades for democratization,
human rights, and the obligations and connections between
African states and international organizations, including inter-
national finance, do not make sense? But these are not the
questions posed by the authors. Instead, they seek to clarify,
streamline, and justify the norms, processes, and institutions
that must be created or employed to preserve the post-colonial
state by putting it back together where it has collapsed or
saving it from certain collapse where it has not.
III. DECONSTRUCTING THE RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT
In the section On the reconstruction of collapsed states or
the prevention of such an eventuality, Collapsed. States offers
four thoughtful essays on humanitarian responses 7 through
the United Nations, the generalized problem of foreign inter-
vention,"8 democratization, 9 and the role of the personal dic-
tator or "strongman."9 At the end of the book, Zartman ties
all these themes together and attempts to give them coher-
ence." These contributions are premised on four basic as-
sumptions: 1) the collapse of the African state can either be
avoided or, once collapsed, can put back together; 2) the pres-
ervation of the post-colonial state is a good thing; 3) the inter-
national community-particularly the industrial democracies of
the West that control the United Nations and the global econo-
my-has the interest and ability to play a key role in the re-
construction of the state; and 4) it would be a good thing for
them to do so. The obvious expectation here is that Africans
will accept this agenda and cooperate in their own "salvation."
87. Francis M. Deng, State Collapse: The Humanitarian Challenge to the Unit-
ed Nations, in COLLAPSED STATES, supra note 9, at 207.
88. Ibrahim A. Gambari, The Role of Foreign Intervention in African Recon-
struction, in COLLAPSED STATES, supra note 9, at 221.
89. Marina Ottaway, Democratization in Collapsed States, in COLLAPSED
STATES, supra note 9, at 235.
90. Njuguna Ng'ethe, Strongmen, State Formation, Collapse, and Reconstruc-
tion in Africa, in COLLAPSED STATES, supra note 9, at 251.
91. See generally Zartman, Putting Things Back Together, supra note 11.
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The collapse of a state, as Francis Deng correctly notes, "is
associated with humanitarian tragedies resulting from armed
conflict, communal violence, and gross violations of human
rights."92 In the last several years, these problems have en-
gulfed several African states as well as the former Yugoslavia
and Haiti. For people in such countries, life becomes a living
hell as massacres and genocidal killings become commonplace.
Power-mongers and narrow-minded chauvinists take over and
anarchy reigns supreme. In a number of cases, the authors of
the killings become its victims as violence spirals and devours
up the center." As this orgy continues, the international
press spotlights it and brings the crisis to the living rooms of
prosperous homes in the West. Public policy is overwhelmed as
non-governmental relief and human rights organizations mobi-
lize public opinion and humanitarian intervention becomes
inevitable. This was particularly the case with Rwanda in
1994. But the international community, however that is de-
fined, has not developed a coherent formula for response, short
of providing temporary relief from hunger, conflict, shelter, and
disease. There are no institutional mechanisms to identify the
root causes of the crisis in order to address them permanently
instead of merely offering stop-gap measures.94
Deng argues that if humanitarian interventions are war-
ranted, their purposes should be clearly defined at the out-
set.95 He proposes a three-pronged strategy of "arresting the
immediate crisis, appraising the situation with reference to the
92. Deng, supra note 87, at 207.
93. In 1994, in Rwanda, the officials of the Hutu-controlled state killed hun-
dreds of thousands of Tutsis following the death in a mysterious plane crash of
President Juvenal Habyarimana. See Mutua, supra note 7, at A13. The Hutus lost
control of the state as the Tutsi-dominated RPF stepped up its assault on the
central power of Rwanda and took it over. Id.
94. Francis Deng puts this knee-jerk response in exact terms:
When the breakdown of civil society or the outbreak of unmanageable
civil violence necessitates a humanitarian intervention from the interna-
tional community, [i.e., the West], a further crisis situation arises with
respect to the precise objectives and conduct of the operations involved.
Usually, the immediate purpose of delivering urgently needed relief sup-
plies becomes compelling and overwhelming. Little attention is paid to the
conditions leading to the crisis or the longer-term perspective of reconstruc-
tion and normalization of a self-sustaining order; in other words, putting
the collapsed state back together.




root causes, and designing a plan of action for the recon-
struction of the society and the state."6 Although Deng ar-
gues that interventions should have "global legitimacy,"97 he
pleads for Western leadership which he sees as indispens-
able.9" But he is right when he asserts that inaction by the
international community is indefensible where a state becomes
incapable or unwilling to act responsibly towards its citizens.
The questions then are who intervenes, in what manner, and
for which purposes? Deng favors the development of norms and
processes for detecting crises before they explode. But he then
proposes a three-tiered process of repair where the soci-
ety/state has collapsed: 1) understanding how the past explains
the present; 2) designing a response in view of those findings;
and 3) implementing the plan of recovery. Although this pre-
scription sounds open-ended, Deng calls for a "strategy for
restoring the collapsed state ], one that entails keeping basic
order in the aftermath of a pacification campaign"9' so as to
reconstruct "a functioning and self-regenerating system of
legitimacy and authority.""' He does not say why the new
state would function better where the last one failed or why
and whether the international community has the capability or
should be expected to create more legitimate regimes. If the
experiences of Somalia, Liberia, and Rwanda provide any his-
torical lessons, they are that the international community-the
96. Id. at 208.
97. Id. at 210-11.
98. Id. I am at a loss to explain why Deng puts so much faith in the ability
of the industrial democracies of the West to promote human rights in the South,
an assumption that is at odds with history. He writes, for example, that
"5i]ndustrial democracies cannot operate without defending standards of human
rights and political procedures that are being egregiously violated." Id. at 210-11.
First of all, the use of human rights as an instrument of foreign policy by West-
ern countries is a very recent development, and it is a tool that has been used
selectively and inconsistently. During the Cold War, the West supported some of
the most brutal and murderous regimes. These included virtually all the repressive
military regimes in Central and South America and notoriously violent and abu-
sive regimes in South Africa, Iran under the Shah, Zaire, South Korea, and Ethio-
pia under Haile Selassie. More recently, trade trumped human rights when the
Clinton administration decided to delink human rights and trade in connection
with China's Most Favored Nation status. See China's Gradual Route to Reform,
ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 19, 1995, at 6B; Douglas Jehl, U.S. is to Maintain
Trade Privileges for China's Goods, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1994, at A6. More often
than not, human rights is a weapon, not a principle of foreign policy.
99. Deng, supra note 87, at 215.
100. Id.
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rich North in this case-does not have the interest, patience,
knowledge, or resources to address basic problems of state
legitimacy.'' It may be too much to ask of the international
community beyond its typical anti-catastrophe responses." 2
Nowhere have the difficulties of "humanitarian" interven-
tion been more evident than in Somalia. Neither the United
States nor the United Nations could decide where humanitari-
an responses ended and state reconstruction started nor did
they appear to understand Somali society. Anxious to quickly
recreate the state, the United States tried, at first, to reconcile
all the major factions in Mogadishu in order to reunite the
city.'0 3 Later, however, the United Nations and the United
States attempted to isolate General Mohammed Farrah °Aidid,
one of Somalia's key leaders, and to support other factions.' 4
This decision highly polarized the situation, leading to a state
101. After all, state collapse in Africa is directly related to the end of the Cold
War, the diminished geopolitical significance of the region, and the withdrawal of
economic, political, and military support by Western countries as well as the col-
lapse of the Soviet bloc. State collapse is primarily a result of lack of a strategic
interest, as seen by the West, in its client states in Africa.
102. The Somali crisis, and international efforts to put the state back together,
proved the fragility of the commitment by the West to restore collapsed states in
Africa. Operation Restore Hope, launched in December 1992 by then-U.S. President
George Bush as a "mission of mercy," appeared designed to secure relief supply
lines in order to enable international agencies to respond to the famine. See
Hussein M. Adam, Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born, in COLLAPSED STATES,
supra note 10, at 84-87. But the mission quickly turned into a policing and politi-
cal reconstruction program, leading some Somali factions, particularly that of Gen-
eral Mohammed Farrah Aidid, to treat the U.S. force as just another party to the
conflict. Id. In August 1993, a clash between General Aidid's faction and U.S.
forces left eighteen American elite soldiers and many more Somalis dead. Id. Some
of the dead Americans were subjected to humiliating treatment in the streets of
Mogadishu. That incident raised a public uproar in the United States and caused
the Clinton administration to rethink the American role not only specifically in
Somalia, but also generally with respect to other internal conflicts abroad and
peace-keeping/making operations. Id. The incident eventually influenced the with-
drawal of U.S. troops, leaving Somalia much like the United States had found
it-without a state. See generally id. The lessons of the Somali experience may
explain American inaction in Rwanda. See Joyce Price, Why Rwanda was Ignored,
WASH. TIMES, July 31, 1994, at A4. The United States refrained from intervening
in that conflict until the RPF emerged victorious. When U.S. troops entered the
region, it was with the specific mandate of airlifting supplies to refugee camps in
Zaire where over one million Hutus had fled. See Craig Nelson, Rwanda: US Keen
to Prove its Concern Over Refugees' Plight, INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 1, 1994, at
9.
103. Adam, supra note 102, at 84.
104. Id. at 85.
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of war between Aidid's faction and the intervention forces. °5
In March 1995, with the operation bogged down, international
fatigue set in, and the U.N. forces abandoned Somalia to its
own fate.1"' The operation, which lasted 15 months and in-
volved 30,000 U.N. troops and cost approximately $1 billion,
was declared a failure.
10 7
The intervention in the Liberian crisis by the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) through its
force, the Economic Community of West African States Moni-
toring Group (ECOMOG), has run into similar problems.
Charles Taylor, the major factional leader whose National
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) controls over three-quarters
of Liberia, has battled with ECOMOG to a standstill as he
seeks supreme control of the country.' The United Nations
role in Liberia has been much more circumscribed, preferring
instead to support efforts by ECOWAS to find a peaceful settle-
ment.0 9 Martin Lowenkopf suggests that the international
community must occupy Liberia since the Liberian factions are
incapable of putting aside their differences to reconstruct soci-
ety and the state."0 In a bold passage, Lowenkopf infantilizes
105. Id. at 84-87.
106. After the withdrawal of U.N. and U.S. troops from Somalia in March
1995, Secretary of Defense William Perry was reported as having said that "Amer-
ican goals in Somalia could not sustain the large loss of Somali lives that Ameri-
can military strikes were causing, much less the American casualties the Somalis
had caused." Jim Ioagland, Wars Old and New Caution Against Alliances in the
Balkans, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 8, 1995, at B7.
107. See Michael Begg, UN Withdrawal From Somalia, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 15,
1995, at 15. To underline the failure of the U.N. effort, U.N. troops were being
fired on even as they withdrew under the protection of heavily armed U.S. Ma-
rines. See CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Mar. 17, 1995, at P. The failure of the effort
was partially attributed to the centralization of power by the United Nations in
Mogadishu, its strengthening of the warlords, and its inability to work with village
elders and Somali NGOs. Begg, supra.
108. See generally Lowenkopf, supra note 51.
109. Id. at 98.
110. In advancing the case for United Nations intervention, Lowenkopf argues
that:
For, in spite of its alleged partiality during the conflict, and scapegoating
in Somalia, the United Nations is the only international organization
with the capabilities of pressing a political agenda once peace has been
established. Will it be a Somali-type arrangement, where outsiders decide
how long to stay (or, rather, one that reflects the lessons of Somalia's
difficulties)? Or will it be a more limited, Angola-type (and demonstrably
insufficient) UN overseeing of the peace process?
Id. at 106 (citations omitted). He notes that ECOWAS should play a minor role in
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
Liberians and suggests recolonization through a renewed Unit-
ed Nations-World Bank-United States trusteeship system:
A more appropriate way to delink Liberia's difficult transition
from partisan politics would be to establish, alongside
Cotonou's Ruling Council, an advisory council directed by a
representative of the UN Secretary-General and consisting of
representatives of UN agencies, the IMF and IBRD,
ECOWAS, and the United States (which still has the longest
experience in Liberia, and should remain the principal aid
donor), and a number of Liberian 'unofficials' (from churches,
educational, voluntary and professional organizations, and
chiefs) as advisors. It would share with the Liberian transi-
tional government control of the financial resources and secu-
rity forces, through international donors, voluntary agencies,
ECOWAS military personnel, and what hopefully will come
to be a large array of Liberian and international technical
advisors, and to arbitrate the demands of the several factions
comprising the transitional government." '
In his prognosis for the future of Somalia, Hussein Adam,
who is an African, does not call for Western tutelage. Instead,
he sees a gradual process of reconstruction in which "tradition-
al consociational structures and mechanisms " "' assert them-
selves over the "warlords" and re-establish civil society. In this
scenario, the role of the United States, the United Nations,
and international agencies is very important though supple-
mentary. 3 Ibrahin Gambari, another African, is more tor-
tured by the specter of intervention although he admits its
necessity in cases of extreme suffering.' He is particularly
wary of unilateral, non-African interventions which he sees as
self-interested."' He argues that only multilateral interven-
this process because it is not partial, according to Taylor. Id.
111. Id. at 108.
112. See Adam, supra note 102, at 87.
113. Id. at 86-89.
114. See generally Gambari, supra note 88. Gambari, an academic, is Nigeria's
Permanent Representative to the Nigerian mission at the United Nations in New
York. Two factors make his views interesting: the Nigerian state which he repre-
sents is Africa's most populous nation; it also has for decades been under a brutal
military dictatorship. The heads of state under whom Gambari served, General
brahim Babangida and his successor Sani Abacha, have clamped down on reform-
ers and brought the country to the brink of collapse.
115. He argues that interventions by foreign countries in Africa "have had little
or no interest in the preservation of the state structure as such. Their concerns
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tions "have greater relative merits" because of their "relative
impartiality" and capacity to "diffuse the specific interests that
the foreign powers are seeking to project or protect."11 6 He
concludes that although such interventions "play a strong role
in putting together collapsed or collapsing states," state recon-
struction is primarily a domestic task."' It "goes beyond the
imposition of a foreign-inspired 'solution'; rather it involves a
complex process of political, social, and economic engineering
that must affect positively the internal dynamics of powers of
resource distribution. 1
18
The discussion on the role of foreign or international inter-
vention to restore or arrest state collapse indicates the lack of
clear and acceptable norms, processes, and institutions for
carrying out the task. It also shows the uncertainty about the
extent and role of foreign intervention given the failed exam-
ples in Somalia and Liberia. Lowenkopf, its strongest propo-
nent, does not make a convincing argument for why the West
should or could expend resources to put states like Liberia
back together. Fearful that state collapse may cause untold
suffering, Mazrui has argued that self-colonization through an
African Security Council--composed of South Africa, Ethiopia,
Zaire, Nigeria, and Egypt-may be the only option left."' He
assumes, of course, that those countries, all of which are at
risk of collapse themselves, would stabilize soon. Inexplicably,
some writers have even called for the direct recolonization of
Africa by Europe. 2 By failing to treat the collapse of the
state as a post-colonial African phenomenon, these positions
inherently see such collapses in a negative light. Therefore,
their solutions are, not surprisingly, reconstituting the failed
state.
The last two substantial chapters in the book, by Marina
have almost always been the political complexion of those in control of the state."
Id. at 232.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 233.
118. Id.
119. Ali A. Mazrui, The Message of Rwanda: Recolonize Africa?, NEW PERSP.
Q., Sept. 22, 1994, at 18.
120. See William Pfaff, A New Colonialism?: Europe Must Go Back into Africa,
74 FOREIGN AFF. 2 (1995). Pfaff argues that Europe decolonized Africa too quickly
before it was ready for self-rule and he proposes that recolonization would do the
trick. Id.
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Ottaway and Njuguna Ng'ethe, address reconstitution of the
state primarily from within, albeit with international assis-
tance.'21 Ottaway's democratization panacea is perhaps the
most attractive, offering the possibility of saving the post-colo-
nial state from the twin evils of collapse and despotism. It also
comes at the tail end of a wave of hope in Africa during which
despotic regimes have been moderated or have given way to
reformers employing the language of individual rights and
democracy." But she misidentifies the root of state collapse
by locating its "ultimate cause in the mismanagement, pillage
of resources, and abuses by authoritarian regimes that left the
majority of the population without a stake in the existing sys-
tem.""= She fails to situate it in the failure of state formation
and ultimately in the inchoate nature of the colonial state.
Nevertheless, by examining the recent histories of Somalia,
South Africa, Sudan, and Ethiopia, she pinpoints pitfalls for
democracy. She shows that a transition to democracy must be
preceded by the fragmentation of the elite and the acceptance
by all the fragments of the rules of political competition. As
she puts it:
A country's political elite can break up into groups competing
in the same political arena. In other words, the elite frag-
ments, but the political arena does not. This leads to plural-
ism and democracy: different segments of the elite form polit-
ical parties that vie with each other for the support of the
same pool of voters. The parties that lose an election will
have another chance at a later date, because voters can
choose any party and change their preference. This pluralistic
fragmentation does not lead to the collapse of the state.124
When elites fragment, as they did in Somalia, but refuse
to compete politically because each wants to impose its will by
121. See Ottaway, supra note 89; Ng'ethe, supra note 90.
122. The so-called pro-democracy movement in Africa coincided with, and to a
large extent was connected with, the end of the cold war. See Makau wa Mutua,
Africa Renaissance, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1991, (op-ed), at 23 (discussing the furi-
ous wave of democratic reform that started to sweep across Africa in 1989).
123. Ottaway, supra note 89, at 235. She is right, however, when she notes
that "the development of more democratic political institutions that give a much
larger segment of the population a stake in the system" could avoid "state col-
lapse. Id.
124. Id. at 236.
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force on others, then the state collapses." In South Africa,
where hope for a democratic transition is still alive, Ottaway
sees the danger of elites who may not want to compete as
evidenced by the conduct of Afrikaner extremists or Kwazulu
under its leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi"' Similarly, the
Tigrayan-led government in Ethiopia is reluctant to compete
and has "proceeded to divide Ethiopia into strangely shaped
ethnic regions, the equivalent of the South Africa home-
lands." '127 In other cases, the fusion of religion, civil society,
ethnicity, and the state serve to torpedo democratic initiatives,
as was the case in the Sudan."
Ottaway is wrong, however, when she promotes the idea
that ethnic identity, which has been a strong factor in the
failure of several states, is largely a product of white domina-
tion over the continent.129 While it is true that colonial or
racist policies manipulated ethnicity under the divide-and-rule
strategy, and even created or enhanced certain nationalisms, it
is simply not true that pre-colonial ethnic identities never
existed or that they have not survived. On the contrary, many
African nations have maintained their identities, albeit in
variegated forms. Ottoway makes a big mistake when she
asserts that "[a]s many studies have shown, in Africa the emo-
tional allegiance of most people is not directed originally to the
group that politicians choose to define as the nation, or the
tribe."3 ' I could not disagree more. Ethnic groups or nations,
which predate the despotic colonial and post-colonial states,
have remained the basic identities that most Africans carry,
even in urban areas. There is little mystery here because the
state would have had to be more benign, which it has not been,
to dilute pre-colonial identities. Among other factors, ethnicity
makes democratization difficult because of the failure of the
125. Id. at 237.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 238. She notes that the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF),
the ethnic party that controls the state, has "tried to combine recognition of eth-
nicity in politics with the determination to maintain firm control over the reigns
of power. This control was threatened by the independent ethnic movements. The
TPLF thus attempted to organize [has, in fact, organized] new ethnic movements
in each region, in opposition to the pre-existing ones." Id.
128. Id. at 240.
129. Id. at 240-42.
130. Id. at 243 (footnote omitted).
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state to create a "national" elite that will not necessarily frag-
ment along ethnic lines or, even if it does, retains a "national
interest." Democratization, as a vehicle for avoiding state col-
lapse, is at best a long shot because available evidence strongly
suggests that the post-colonial state may be undemocratizable.
Ng'ethe's prescription of using the strongman to recon-
struct society, though practical, is not appealing. As he himself
admits, "strongmen have been as much a contribution to the
collapse, or the near collapse of the state as the other
factors."'31 The examples offered-Zaire under Mobutu, Gha-
na under Rawlings, Chad under Habre, and Uganda under
Museveni-may collapse again precisely because of the
strongman syndrome. By his nature, the strongman either
cripples civil society or prevents its emergence, vanquishes
good alternate leadership, and disarticulates the elite by ma-
nipulating the society's most explosive cleavages. When he
leaves, for example, by dying unexpectedly in office, a leader-
ship vacuum may ensue. Ng'ethe recognizes this problem,
132
but unless the leader anoints an acceptable successor, chances
of the state holding together are slim. At any rate, a strong-
man by definition is despotic and anti-democratic and merely
postpones the collapse of the state. The reconstruction which
he undertakes is therefore false unless it is followed by stabili-
ty and democratization.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE NEED TO UNSCRAMBLE AFRICA
. In the concluding chapter, Zartman pleads for the col-
lapsed state to be put back together through the reconstitution
of power structures from the bottom up, the restoration of
legitimacy through popular participation, the restoration of the
state's ability to extract and allocate resources, and the provi-
sion of external assistance by wealthier nations and interna-
tional institutions.3" Continuing his central thesis that col-
lapsed states must be reconstructed because without regard to
the nature of the post-colonial state, Zartman argues that:
Both cause and remedy [of state collapse] relate to sociopoliti-
cal structures within a given sovereign territory and people,
131. Ng'ethe, supra note 90, at 257.
132. Id. at 262-63.
133. See generally Zartman, Putting Things Back Together, supra note 11.
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not to the shape of the state itself. It is better to reaffirm the
validity of the existing unit and make it work, using it as a
framework for adequate attention to the concerns of its citi-
zens and the responsibilities of sovereignty, rather than ex-
perimenting with smaller units, possibly more homogeneous
but less broadly based and less stable.184
This determination to preserve European Africa..5 flies
in the face of reality. If the argument had been made four
decades ago when the post-colonial state was being born, per-
haps it would have made sense. What baffles me is why
Zartman insists on reviving the post-colonial state today when
every index shows that the state has not only failed to perform
the functions of statehood, it has itself collapsed in a number
of cases. It is the equivalent of keeping a clinically dead person
on a respirator. Why is it so difficult to imagine Africa without
the current number of states but possibly with more or even
fewer reconfigured entities? Even though evidence shows, as in
the case of Rwanda and Somalia, that the post-colonial state is
both suicidal and genocidal, is it better to revitalize it knowing
that in all probability it will spin out of control again?
The contrived nature of the post-colonial state is at the
center of its crisis. At independence, sovereignty should have
been returned to the pre-colonial states and communities from
which it was taken in the first place. The right to self-determi-
nation should not have been exercised by the colonial state.
The unnatural entity, which never deserved, nor received, the
loyalty of Africans, must be unscrambled peacefully otherwise
different nations will violently free themselves from the wreck-
age of the state at great human cost. Once the smaller, disas-
sembled units are free of the strictures of the post-colonial
state, a movement for consensual political unification may very
well emerge through which larger, more economically viable
units are formed. As Mazrui has argued, the "decolonization" of
colonial boundaries is inevitable:
Over the next century the outlines of most of present-day
African states will change in one of two main ways. One will
be ethnic self-determination, which will create smaller states,
134. Id. at 268.
135. By the term, I mean the political map of Africa with its imposed states
that Europeans forced on the continent in the last century.
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comparable to the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia. The
other will be regional integration, towards larger political
communities and economic unions."'
By arguing for the preservation of the post-colonial state,
Collapsed States seems to go against current data and what
appears to be the inevitability of history. Perhaps more schol-
ars will devote time to developing formulae for a more peaceful
process of disaggregating the colonial state.
136. Ali A. Mazrui, The Bondage of Boundaries: Why Africa's Maps Will Be Re-
drawn, ECONOMIST, Sept. 11, 1993, at 28.
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